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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Rangi Knight appeals from his sentence as a career 
offender, asserting that the District Court based his 
sentence on non-includable offenses. We hold that under 
the plain error doctrine, application of an incorrect Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines range presumptively affects 
substantial rights, even if it results in a sentence that is 
also within the correct range. Accordingly, we hold that the 
District Court committed plain error when it selected 
Knight's sentence from within the wrong range and we will 
vacate Knight's sentence and remand for sentencing so that 
the District Court may apply the correct Guidelines range 
in the first instance.1 
 
I. 
 
Knight's presentence investigation report contained a 
recommended sentence based on the Guidelines. The report 
concluded, inter alia, that Knight should be assigned to 
Criminal History Category VI based on either (a) his total of 
14 criminal history points or (b) his classification as a 
"career offender". This criminal history category produced a 
Guidelines sentencing range of 151 to 188 months. No 
objection was raised to the PSI in court. At the sentencing 
hearing, at which time sentence was rendered in 
accordance with the Guideline range which all parties 
believed to be correct, the District Court stated :"Due to 
the nature and severity of the defendant's prior criminal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a)(2). 
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history, a sentence at the middle of the range is appropriate."2 
The District Court sentenced Knight to 162 months of 
imprisonment. 
 
The government now concedes that Knight's criminal 
history score was erroneously calculated as Category VI 
because that classification included (a) offenses which 
should properly have been excluded under U.S.S.G.  
S 4A1.2(d)(2)(B)3 and (b) a finding of "career offender" which 
was improperly premised on the inclusion of convictions for 
possession with intent to deliver cocaine and reckless 
endangerment, which are not includable.4  Because three of 
the criminal history points attributed to Knight should not 
have been, and because he should not have been classified 
as a career offender, Knight should have been sentenced 
based on Criminal History Category V, rather than Category 
VI. Thus, the correct Guideline range for Knight was 140 to 
175 months, rather than the range of 151 to 188 months 
applied by the District Court. 
 
II. 
 
As we explained above, Knight's sentence was selected 
from the wrong Guideline range, but it also falls within the 
correct Guideline range. Upon review, we are required 
under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 
SS 3551 et seq. (the "Act"), to determine not only whether 
the sentence "is outside the applicable guideline range" but 
also whether it "was imposed as a result of an incorrect 
application of the sentencing guidelines". 18 U.S.C.A. 
S 3742(e)(2), (3). See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See District Court's July 27, 1999 Judgement and Commitment Order 
at 6. In addition, in sentencing Knight, the Court noted that "when a 
judge is confronted with a history of criminal like this . . . [he is] 
stuck 
in the guidelines that have been placed on [defendant] . . . ." Appendix 
at 64. 
 
3. More specifically, the score included points for probationary sentence 
offenses committed while Knight was under 18 years of age and which 
occurred more than five years prior to the offenses for which Knight was 
being sentenced. 
 
4. Under a proper reading of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(3), neither of these 
convictions should have been considered for career offender purposes. 
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193, 202 (1992) (holding that "the reviewing court is obliged 
to conduct two separate inquiries" corresponding to these 
separate grounds for review). Even though a sentence falls 
within the correct range, it nevertheless resulted from an 
incorrect application of the Guidelines if it was chosen from 
the incorrect range. See id. at 203 ("a sentence is imposed 
`as a result of ' an incorrect application of the Guidelines 
when the error results in the district court selecting a 
sentence from the wrong guideline range"). In such a case, 
remand for resentencing is mandated by the Act:"If the 
court of appeals determines that the sentence was imposed 
. . . as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing 
guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further 
sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court 
considers appropriate." 18 U.S.C.A. S 3742(f)(1). See also 
Williams, 503 U.S. at 202 ("First, was the sentence imposed 
. . . as a result of an incorrect application of the 
Guidelines? If so, a remand is required under S 3742(f)(1)."). 
 
Notwithstanding this mandatory and unconditional 
statutory language, our sister Courts of Appeals have held 
that where a defendant has failed to object to a purported 
error before the sentencing court, our review on appeal is 
only to ensure that plain error was not committed. See Fed. 
Rule Crim. P. 52(b).5 Under this standard we must find that 
(1) an error was committed, (2) the error was plain, i.e., 
clear or obvious, and (3) the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights. In addition, even where plain error 
exists, our discretionary authority to order correction is to 
be guided by whether the error seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Nappi , 243 F.3d 
758, 732, 734 (3d Cir. 2001).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. But see United States v. Young, 981 F.2d 180, 190 n.1 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(Justice, J., dissenting) (observing that "mandatory nature of the 
Supreme Court's language in Williams would indicate" that the 
contemporaneous objection rule does not apply "in a case involving 
misapplication of the federal sentencing guidelines"). 
 
6. See generally Michael O'Shaughnessy, Appellate Review of Sentences, 
88 Geo. L.J. 1637, 1643 (May 2000) ("If the defendant . . . fails to raise 
an alleged sentencing error at sentencing . . . the claim will only be 
reviewed on appeal for plain error. Even if the alleged sentencing error 
is plain error, an appellate court may still affirm the sentence on the 
ground that the error was harmless.") (citing cases). 
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There is no question that error was committed and that 
it was plain because, under the Guidelines, Knight should 
have been charged with three fewer criminal history points 
and should not have been classified as a "career offender". 
The Government concedes that the first two elements of our 
plain error test are met, and further, that if we determine 
that Knight's substantial rights were affected, it would not 
be appropriate to argue that we should not exercise our 
discretion to correct the error.7 Nonetheless, the 
government contends that remand is unnecessary because 
Knight cannot show that his sentence would have been 
different had the sentencing range been properly calculated. 
Thus, this appeal turns on whether application of an 
incorrect guideline range resulting in a sentence that is also 
within the correct range affects substantial rights. We hold 
that it presumptively does. 
 
Ordinarily, a defendant who failed to object to an error 
before the trial court must demonstrate prejudice by 
showing that the outcome -- in this context, the sentence 
-- was affected, in the sense that it likely would have been 
different but for the error. However, we have recognized 
that in some circumstances, such prejudice may be 
presumed. As we recently explained: 
 
       Normally, in order for an error to "affect substantial 
       rights" under the third prong of the [plain error] test, 
       the error must have been "prejudicial"--in other words, 
       "[i]t must have affected the outcome of the district 
       court proceedings." It is the defendant who bears the 
       burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. 
       However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that some 
       errors to which no objection was made should be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The government's concession aside, we believe that a sentence 
resulting from a plainly erroneous misapplication of the Guidelines gives 
rise to at least a presumptively appropriate occasion for exercise of our 
discretionary power to correct the error. Cf. United States v. Ford, 88 
F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996) ("sentencing a defendant at the wrong 
guideline range seriously affects the fairness, integrity and public 
reputation of the judicial proceedings."); United States v. Weaver, 161 
F.3d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1998) ("public's confidence in the judicial 
process 
would be undermined if an inadvertent . . . error were to be allowed to 
influence the length of a criminal defendant's sentence"). 
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       "presumed prejudicial" if the defendant cannot make a 
       specific showing of prejudice. 
 
United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citations omitted), quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725 (1993). 
 
Our determination in Adams that denial of a criminal 
defendant's right of allocution is presumptively prejudicial 
was predicated on two factors: First, allocution is supposed 
to affect sentencing, as the defendant may be his own 
"most persuasive and eloquent advocate" in a sentencing 
hearing. Adams, 252 F.3d at 288. See also Adams, 252 
F.3d at 288 ("the right of allocution `is designed to temper 
punishment with mercy in appropriate cases, and to ensure 
that sentencing reflects individualized circumstances' ") 
(quoting United States v. Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st 
Cir. 1994)). Second, although allocution ought to have an 
effect, "the impact of [its] omission on a . . . discretionary 
[sentencing] decision is usually enormously difficult to 
ascertain." Id. at 287 (quoting Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 130). 
 
Both of these factors also support our recognition of 
presumptive prejudice from application of the wrong 
Guidelines range. First, it is beyond cavil that the 
Guidelines are intended to, and do, affect sentencing.8 
Indeed, that is their very raison d'etre. Second, absent a 
fortuitous comment by the sentencing judge on the record, 
it is very difficult to ascertain the impact of an erroneous 
Guidelines range. We therefore conclude that an error in 
application of the Guidelines that results in use of a higher 
sentencing range should be presumed to affect the 
defendant's substantial rights. 
 
Although we have not previously had occasion to address 
the element of prejudice where a sentence falls within both 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Thayer , 201 F.3d 214, 230 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(observing that although a sentencing court may"approach the 
Guidelines with a `tentative view' of the sentence appropriate to the case 
. . . [it] may also select a sentence based on its position within the 
range 
specified by the Guidelines"); United States v. Lavoie, 19 F.3d 1102, 
1104 (6th Cir. 1994) (observing that "a district court's sentencing 
determination is impacted by its understanding of the appropriate 
guideline range"). 
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the correct and incorrect Guidelines ranges, our holding 
today is in keeping with our prior cases that have 
recognized the potentially prejudicial nature of Guideline 
calculation errors. See United States v. Pollen , 978 F.2d 78, 
90 (3d Cir. 1992) ("The district court's improper calculation 
. . . , resulting in a significantly higher Guideline 
sentencing range, certainly is an error that seriously 
affected [defendant]'s substantial rights and so amounts to 
plain error."); United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 869 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1995) ("This circuit and others have found that the 
miscalculation of a defendant's offense level `certainly is 
error that seriously affect[s] the defendant's rights, and so 
amounts to plain error.' ") (quoting Pollen, 978 F.2d at 90).9 
 
The practical effect of the presumption we recognize 
today is that a sentence based upon a plainly erroneous 
Guideline range will ordinarily be remanded so that the 
District Court may exercise its discretion to choose an 
appropriate sentence based upon the correct range, unless 
the record shows that the sentence was unaffected by the 
error. This approach effectuates the intent of the Act that 
"it [be] the prerogative of the district court, not the court of 
appeals, to determine, in the first instance, the sentence 
that should be imposed in light of certain factors properly 
considered under the Guidelines." Williams , 503 U.S. at 
205. We applied similiar reasoning in the plain error 
context in Pollen, wherein we "decline[d] to engage in the 
type of speculation urged by the government concerning 
whether the district court would have [imposed the same 
sentence] under a properly calculated Guideline sentence 
range", noting that such speculation "is inappropriate" in 
light of the inherently discretionary nature of the 
sentencing court's decision. Pollen, 978 F.2d at 89-90. 
 
In Pollen we considered remand necessary despite the 
government's assertion that the district court had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Although the errors at issue in Pollen and Felton involved 
miscalculation of the offense level rather than of the criminal history, 
we 
can see no reason to treat one type of misapplication of the Guidelines 
differently from another. Choosing a sentence from the wrong range has 
the same propensity to affect a defendant's substantial right to receive a 
fair sentence no matter what the source or nature of the error. 
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"intimated" that it would have imposed the same sentence 
under a lower Guideline range. 978 F.2d at 89-90. In the 
present case, the District Court did not intimate that the 
sentence would have been the same if the correct range 
were applied. On the contrary, the Court stated that it was 
selecting a sentence "at the middle of the range", and that 
its decision was predicated on the defendant's incorrectly 
assessed prior criminal history. Under these circumstances, 
even if we were inclined to disregard our admonition in 
Pollen not to speculate, we would be unable to conclude 
that it is even reasonably likely that the same sentence 
would have been imposed if the correct range and history 
were considered. Because the record does not permit us to 
find that the same sentence would have been imposed, we 
hold that Knight was prejudiced by the incorrect 
application of the Guidelines, and we therefore remand to 
allow the District Court to impose a sentence based upon 
a correct application of the Guidelines. 
 
Our holding today is in accord with decisions of several 
of our sister Courts of Appeals, which effectively (albeit not 
explicitly) apply a similar presumption. For example, the 
Seventh Circuit has held: 
 
       Because it . . . sentenced [defendant] on the basis of 
       the wrong Guidelines range, the district court 
       committed plain error. . . . . Although the sentence that 
       the district court selected in this case is within the 
       correct as well as the incorrect Guidelines range, we 
       must remand unless we have reason to believe that the 
       error did not affect the district court's selection of a 
       particular sentence. 
 
United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 
1994). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has explained that: 
 
       If the range the court used resulted from an incorrect 
       application of the guidelines, an after-the-fact 
       determination that the sentence actually imposed 
       happened to be within the proper range does not cure 
       the court's error. The actual sentence imposed in such 
       a case is not material because it is the district court's 
       application of the guidelines to arrive at the sentencing 
       range that is at issue, not that court's discretionary 
       choice of sentence within that range. 
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United States v. Lavoie, 19 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1994). 
See also, e.g., United States v. Plaza-Garcia, 914 F.2d 345, 
347-48 (1st Cir. 1990) (remanding sentence within both 
erroneously applied and correct Guideline ranges under 
plain error doctrine, because sentence "may well have been 
influenced by the [erroneous] sentencing recommendation"); 
United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(although it was unclear whether correcting error would 
have any effect on sentencing level, remand was required 
under plain error analysis);10United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 
1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding, where court 
miscalculated criminal history points, that "[t]he error 
clearly affected [defendant]'s substantial rights because the 
extra points caused [defendant] to be sentenced at a more 
severe guideline range"); United States v. Spears, 159 F.3d 
1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1998) (remanding where juvenile 
offenses were wrongly included, resulting in wrong criminal 
history category: "The district court looked at the wrong 
sentencing range when determining [defendant]'s sentence. 
We have determined this to constitute plain error."); United 
States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994) ("A 
sentence based on an incorrect guideline range constitutes 
an error affecting substantial rights and can thus 
constitute plain error."); United States v. Weaver, 161 F.3d 
528, 530 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting government's assertion 
that "error did not affect [defendant's] substantial rights 
because . . . sentence he received fell within the Guidelines 
range . . . which would have applied absent the error");11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Second Circuit expressly rejected the government's reliance on 
United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1988) for the 
proposition that the "sentence [could] be sustained because the sentence 
actually imposed . . . was within the Guidelines ranges for both [the 
correct and incorrect levels]." 143 F.3d at 675. The Court noted that 
"Bermingham permits this Court to affirm a sentence derived from an 
incorrect offense level only where the sentence also falls within the 
sentencing range for the correct offense level, and the District Court has 
indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence under either 
offense level." Id. at 676 (emphasis in original). In contrast, the record 
here "suggest[ed]" that the District Court would have imposed a lesser 
sentence. Id. 
 
11. In Weaver, the Eighth Circuit noted the District Court's indication at 
sentencing that it would sentence the defendant"at the bottom" of the 
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United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 
1999) (holding where correction of error "alters[defendant]'s 
sentence range from 51-63 months to 46-57 months . .. . 
[t]he fact that the guideline ranges overlap does not make 
a plain error harmless."). 
 
We recognize that other courts have found that 
sentencing errors do not affect a substantial right where, 
because the sentence fell within both the right and the 
wrong range, the same sentence could have been imposed 
without error. See, e.g. United States v. Leonard, 157 F.3d 
343 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding sentence imposed where it 
could be reinstated on remand). We believe that these cases 
provide too little protection for the substantial right at 
issue, and that the rule which we follow today better 
effectuates the Guidelines' purpose to institute fair and 
uniform sentencing.12 A defendant has a right to a sentence 
that not only falls within a legally permissible range, but 
that was imposed pursuant to correctly applied law. 13 See 
United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.23 1234, 12390 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (observing that defendant is entitled to have "his 
sentence determined in accordance with the applicable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
applicable range, and observed that because "the court might well have 
sentenced [defendant] to a lesser term . . . under the range that [should] 
have been applied", it was "unwilling to say that [defendant]'s 
substantial 
rights were not affected". 161 F.3d at 530 (citing with approval United 
States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
12. See S. Report 86, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1984, p. 3269 
("The provisions for appellate judicial review of sentences in section 
3742 
are designed to reduce materially any remaining unwarranted disparities 
by giving the right to appeal a sentence outside the guidelines and by 
providing a mechanism to assure that sentences inside the guidelines are 
based on correct application of the guidelines.") (emphasis added). See 
also, e.g., United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing that "the Guidelines were designed to promote fair and 
consistent treatment of offenders"); United States v. Lavoie, 19 F.3d 
1102, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that "appellate review of sentences is 
intended to further the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984's primary goal of 
insuring correct application of the guidelines"). 
 
13. The Act recognizes these distinct rights in providing separately for 
correction of sentences "outside the applicable guideline range" and 
sentences "imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the 
sentencing guidelines". 18 U.S.C.A. S 3742(e)(2), (3). 
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law") (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)). 
Because imposition of a sentence selected from the wrong 
range is likely to impair a defendant's right to a fair 
sentence, we believe it is appropriate under plain error 
analysis to remand for sentencing under the correct range 
notwithstanding a defendant's inability to establish that his 
separate right to receive a sentence within the applicable 
guideline range was also impaired. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court's judgment and order of sentence and remand with 
instructions for the District Court to resentence Knight 
within the correct Guidelines range. 
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Teste: 
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